Cross-Cutting Crises: Comparing Euro Crisis and Migration Crisis. A Legal Perspective. by Repasi, R. (René)
European Research 
Centre for Economic and 
Financial Governance
euro-cefg.eu
RESEARCH FELLOWS
Fabian Amtenbrink
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(Scientific Director EURO-CEFG)
Casper de Vries
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Stefaan van den Bogaert
Leiden University
Matthias Haentjens
Leiden University
Markus Haverland
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Klaus Heine
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Madeleine Hosli
Leiden University
Alessio M. Pacces
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Erik Pruyt
Delft University of Technology
René Repasi
Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(Scientific Coordinator EURO-CEFG)
Citizens, populism and politicisation:
European economic governance and beyond
Rotterdam, 18 May 2017
Cross-cutting Crises: Comparing Euro-Crisis 
and Migration Crisis. 
A Legal Perspective.
Introduction 
 Comparing Euro-Crisis and Migration Crisis
– The so-called ‘Euro-Crisis’
– The ‘Migration Crisis’
 The contribution of EU law to the lack of efficiency of EU crisis 
responses
 Comparing EU law in ‘crisis times’ with EU law in ‘normal times’
 Conclusions
Euro-Crisis
 The so-called ‘Euro-Crisis’
– Multiple crises
• Crisis of financial regulation (cf. subprime mortgage crisis ‘infects’ EU banks)
• Crisis of lack of economic policy coordination (cf. the creation of ‘bubbles’ such 
as the housing bubble in Spain or the ‘financial institutions bubble’ in Cyprus 
and Ireland)
• Crisis of excessive legacy government debt and deficit (cf. Greek Debt Crisis)
– Crisis Responses
• Bailing-out ‘systemically relevant’ credit institutions
• Stimulating interbank lending
• Stimulating (private) demand and (private) investments
• Providing financial assistance to Member States
Euro-Crisis
 The so-called ‘Euro-Crisis’
– Legal Framework
• Economic Policy Coordination (Article 121 TFEU) (preventing excessive deficts)
• Excessive Deficit Procedure (Article 126 TFEU) (preventing threats to fiscal stability)
– Naming and Shaming
– Market-based enforcement 
– Fines
• Monetary Policy (maintaining price stability)
– Legally binding, centralised decision-making (ESCB)
– Working method: Increasing/decreasing money supply
– Tools: Open market operations, minimum reserves, ‘lender of last resort’ (for banks)
Euro-Crisis
Crisis Response Member States EU
Bailing-out ‘systemically 
relevant’ credit 
institutions
Finaniancial means to bail-out No financial means to bail-out (due to limited 
budgetary capacities)
COM: veto player through EU State  aid control
Stimulating interbank 
lending
Cleaning balance sheets of banks:
• bail-out
• state garantuees
No financial means to bail-out (due to limited 
budgetary capacities)
COM: veto player through EU State  aid control
ECB: Increase of liquidity
Stimulating (private) 
demand and (private) 
investments
Fiscal Policy
Subsidising private demand
Subsidising private investments
Limited own fiscal policy 
− due to limited budgetary capacities
− EIB, EFSI
COM: veto player through EU State  aid control
Providing financial 
assistance to Member 
States
Bi-lateral/Mulit-lateral financial 
assistance (within the limits set by 
Article 125 TFEU): EFSF, ESM
Limited financial assistance 
− due to limited budgetary capacities
− due to limits set by Article 122(2) TFEU: EFSM
Migration Crisis
 The ‘Migration Crisis’
– Multiple crises
• Crisis of the ‘Dublin System’ (responsibility for ‘irregular migrants’ of the MS 
whose borders were crossed irregularly)
• Crisis of external border control
• Crisis of common asylum standards (triggering migration of refugees within EU)
– Crisis Response
• Redistribution of refugees between Member States
• Closing borders (externally as internally (Schengen border controls))
• Financial assistance for Member States with a lot of refugees
Migration Crisis
 The ‘Migration Crisis’
– Legal framework
• Common Policy for Visa (Article 77(2)(a) TFEU)
• Common European Asylum System (Article 78(2) TFEU)
• Common Policy for Legal Immigration (Article 79(2) TFEU) limited by the right of 
Member States to define the volume of legal immigration
• Emergency Powers for the EU in the event of Mass influx (Article 78(3) TFEU, 
Directive 2001/55/EC)
• Solidarity clause in Article 80 TFEU
• Decision-making in the Council requires qualified majority voting
Migration Crisis
Crisis Response Member States EU
Redistribution of 
Refugees
Bi-lateral and multilateral agreements Provisional Measures (Article 78(3) TFEU)
Long-term Measures (Article 78(2)(e) TFEU)
External Border Control Bi-lateral and multilateral agreements Measures to strengthen the common external 
border control: Article 77(2)(b) and (d) TFEU
Establishing Border Control Agency: Article 
77(2)(b) and (d) TFEU
Harmonising Asylum
Standards
Coordination of standards Measures to harmonise standards: Article 78(2) 
TFEU
Establishing Asylum Agency: Article 78(2) TFEU
Providing financial 
assistance to Member 
States
Bi-lateral/Mulit-lateral financial 
assistance (within the limits set by 
Article 125 TFEU)
Limited financial assistance 
− due to limited budgetary capacities
Comparing Euro-Crisis and Migration Crisis
 Both crises have in common:
– Exogenous shock triggered developments that surpassed the 
capacities of single Member States to mitigate the negative effects of 
these developments
– Consequence: Calling for European solutions
• Relief for the most affected Member States (call for solidarity)
• Protection against spillover effects from the most affected Member States to less 
affected Member States (call for effective control)
– Solutions: Intergovernmental negotiations within the European Council
– Intergovernmental solutions failed or were likely to fail
Comparing Euro-Crisis and Migration Crisis
 Both crises differ:
– EU legal framework at hand to find European solutions
• Euro Crisis: Either no legal base or no budgetary capacities
• Migration Crisis: Legal bases allowing for qualified majority voting
– ‘Buying’ time for intergovernmental solutions through EU-wide action
• Euro Crisis: ECB’s monetary policy eased financial market operators
• Migration Crisis: No action.
Comparing Euro-Crisis and Migration Crisis
 Interim Conclusions
– When faced with a crisis, EU politics is not able to present quick 
European solutions
– As a consequence, Member States start acting on their own
– This creates an image of a ‘weak’ and ‘incompetent’ EU
• from the perspective of Member States that are more affected by the crisis: EU 
refuses to help countries in need 
• from the perspective of Member States that are less affected by the crisis: EU 
undermines national efforts to shield a country against spillover effects
– Reason for this can be found in (the combination of ):
• lack of Union institutions that can act in emergency situations
• Intergovernmental method
Contributions of EU law
 Contributions of EU law to these interim conclusions
– NOT: EU legal framework that does not provide for sufficient legal 
bases to act on the basis of qualified majority voting (probably the 
case for the ‘Euro-Crisis’, not the case for the ‘Migration Crisis’)
– NOT: EU law that does not allow for empowering the Commission or 
Union agencies to act with executive powers (CJEU, Case C-270/12, UK 
v Parliament and Council (short selling))
– Lack of trust in Member States’ willingness and ability to comply with 
EU requirements
• Ignorance of economic policy guidelines and EDP in the past
• Differing asylum standards despite extensive harmonisation (CEAS)
Contributions of EU law
 Change of perspective
– EU law does not distinguish between crisis and normal modus
– EU legal framework is the same in normal times as in crisis times
 Issue of Compliance under EU law
– Internal Market law
• Individual rights enshrined in Primary law (no need to implement rights into national law)
• Direct Effect and Supremacy of Primary law individual rights
• National courts enforce EU individual rights against national institutions on the initiative of 
affected individuals
• European Commission can rely on rights with direct effect against Member States
• Individual rights in secondary law (which requires implementation) have vertical direct 
effect after the expiry of the transposition period
Contributions of EU law
 Issue of Compliance under EU law
– How does compliance work in ‘normal times’?
• Euro legal framework
– No direct effect
– No individual rights
• Migration law
– Big parts: No individual rights and no direct effect
– Where there are individual rights of third-country nationals, these rights are only 
enshrined in secondary law (which requires implementation)
– These individual rights can have vertical direct effect after the expiry of the 
transposition period
Conclusions
 Internal Market law shows that ‘supranationalism’ supersedes 
intergovernmental bargaining
– Internal Market law allows for qualified majority voting concerning 
inconvenient subject-matters
– Enforcement is secured by affected individuals in front of national courts
 Where conditions for effective supranationalism are not met, 
intergovernmentalism takes over
– Shortcoming of unanimity voting and blockade by single countries
– Loss of public support for EU measures
Conclusions
 Based on this understanding …
– the EU can establish and uphold an internal market in good times and in 
bad times in overcoming conflicting political will of Member States
– outside the internal market, the EU can run other policy areas in good times 
but not overcome conflicting political will of Member States in crisis times
 Call for the EU to manage crises is valid but its current governance is 
not able to deliver (which creates frustration with citizens) …
– as long as compliance in other fields than internal market is not enhanced;
– as long as emergency competences are conferred upon the EU equipped 
with sufficient legitimacy to act against the conflicting political will of single 
Member States
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